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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
LABOR WAS NOT A CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE UNIQUE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
Nothing in the heirs' Brief should dissuade this Court from 
determining that the trial court erred in its conclusion that 
"Joel's labor was not a capital contribution." (R. 258). 
Joel and Fred created a partnership out of Joel's labor and 
Fred's money, individual assets that they recognized as mutually 
exclusive and equally essential personal resources. During 
Fred's lifetime, the partners acted and spoke as if they 
respected these contributions to the partnership as equal for all 
partnership purposes. It is, therefore, entirely reasonable to 
conclude from their conduct and partnership agreement that Fred 
and Joel intended their individual partnership contributions to 
be treated identically upon dissolution. 
A. This Court should review de novo the issue of whether 
Joel's labor constituted a capital contribution. 
The trial court's determination rejecting Joel's theory that 
his labor was a capital contribution to the partnership was a 
determination of law. The pertinent Conclusion of Law stated: 
E. The parties contributed equal capital to the 
partnership. Fred's contribution was his own money. 
Joel's contribution was the $1500 purchase price of the 
Corner Property and the gift of his remaining capital 
by Fred, to equalize their contributions. The evidence 
of this gift of capital contribution to Joel was clear 
and convincing. Joel's labor was not a capital 
contribution. Id. 
2S0\2288D 1 
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The heirs contend that the trial court's conclusion was 
actually a factual finding requiring a marshalling of evidence 
supporting the finding and demonstration that this evidence is 
insufficient. (Heirs' Reply at 22). However, it is clear that 
the Utah Supreme Court considers analysis of capital 
contributions under the partnership distribution statutes to be a 
question of law. Eardley v. Sammons, 8 Utah 2d 159, 330 P.2d 
122, 125 (1958) . The Eardley Court remanded the case for certain 
factual considerations and then analyzed the partners' respective 
positions under the partnership dissolution statutes because of 
its "duty to 'pass upon . . . all questions of law involved in 
the case . . . necessary to [its] final determination. . . . ' " 
Id. 
The Tenth Circuit, analyzing whether a partner's personal 
services were a capital contribution, noted that "[t]here [was] 
no dispute in the facts and the only question is the permissible 
conclusions that may be drawn therefrom." 
Farris v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 222 F.2d 320, 321 
(10th Cir. 1955). Similarly, in this case the facts concerning 
Fred and Joel's partnership agreement are not disputed. This 
cross appeal merely addresses the trial court's conclusion "drawn 
therefrom." 
A Wisconsin court addressed a comparable partnership 
dissolution issue wherein one partner claimed his "skill and 
labor constitutes a capital interest in the partnership assets" 
while the other partner denied his entitlement "to either 
250X22885 1 ~ 
compensation or consideration of his contribution as a capital 
investment." See Thompson v. Beth, 111 N.W.2d 171, 174 (Wise. 
1961) (affirming laboring partner's efforts as capital 
contribution). That court stated, "The real issue in the case is 
whether under the [relevant] statutes, the plaintiff's labor in 
the construction of the buildings comes within the definition of 
the words 'contribution' and 'capital' as used in the statutes." 
Id. In Utah, both statutory interpretation and common law 
interpretation present questions of law reviewed for correctness. 
See Bennion v. Graham Resources, Inc., 849 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 
1993) (interpretation of statute is question of law); Trujillo v. 
Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992) (interpretation of 
binding case law is question of law). 
The section of the Utah partnership statutes controlling 
dissolution states that the rules for distribution only apply 
"subject to any agreement to the contrary." See Utah Code Ann. § 
48-1-37 (1998). Reviewing the trial court's oral decision in 
this case1 demonstrates that it reached its legal conclusion 
without addressing the factual issue of the existence of any 
agreement contrary to general statutory rules for distribution on 
dissolution. The trial court's failure to reach this issue 
distinguishes this case from precedent allegedly supporting the 
1
 The trial court noted arguments of counsel based on case 
law; stated that Joel and Fred both participated in their 
partnership, "as should most partners;" and then declared that 
Joel's labor nevertheless was not a capital contribution. (R. 
282 pp. 204-05) . 
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heirs' contention that "the determination of whether an agreement 
exists to treat labor as capital is a finding of fact."2 See 
Heirs' Reply at 22 (citing Schymanski v. Conventz, 674 P.2d 281, 
284 (Alaska 1983)(remanding for factual clarifications underlying 
conclusion that personal services were non-cash capital 
contribution to partnership)). 
In the instant case, therefore, the trial court's decision 
that labor is not a capital contribution was correctly entered in 
its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as one of the 
Conclusions of Law. This Court should, therefore, review the 
conclusion de novo. 
B. The trial court erred by failing to recognize that, 
even under Utah partnership statutes, Fred and Joel's 
individualized partnership understanding should control 
analysis of their partnerships capital account during 
dissolution. 
The trial court's legal error was in failing to recognize 
that Fred's and Joel's individualized partnership agreements, not 
generic partnership law, should control analysis of their 
partnership's dissolution under Utah partnership statutes. The 
relevant section of the Utah partnership statutes states that the 
rules for distribution only apply "subject to any agreement to 
2
 Ironically, even if the trial court's conclusion were a 
finding, there exists no evidence to marshall contrary to Joel's 
testimony describing the partnership premise. Joel consistently 
testified that his labor and Fred's money were equally essential 
partnership ingredients intended by the partners to be respected 
and treated equally in all partnership aspects. The heirs 
presented no contrary testimony. However, it was not the 
particulars of this partnership upon which the trial court based 
its conclusion, but rather its interpretation of decisional law. 
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the contrary." See Utah Code Ann. § 4 8-1-37 (1998). Joel's 
testimony demonstrates that he and F 'red expressly and/or 
implicitly created an agreement that Joel's labor constituted a 
partners 1 I :i p < :: o ri t r i b u t :i c > i l e qi i a ] t c F i < B d' £ • t no n e;\, :i i I a ] ] r e s p e c t: s , 
which should include protected status as a capital contribution. 
Joel testified that he and Fred recognized Joel's labor and 
F r e d' s rn o i i e y a s i i 11 11: i i a ] 1 y e x c .1 u s :i v e a i i d e q u a ] 1 y esse n t i a 1 
individual assets without, which their partnership could not 
exist. (R. 2 82,, pp. 7 3 74, 85, 96, 14 7-49). Trial testimony 
demonstrated that without any exception, Fred and J oel spoke ai id 
acted as if these assets, once contributed to the partnership, 
meri ted eqi ia] respect f or a ] ] pai 11 iei sh :i p purposes. Id at 13 , 
21-22, 35-38, 55-56, 85, 87, 96, 105, 139 -40, 143-44, 147 49, 
154-55 . 11: can be reasonab 1 y inf erred that Fred intended this 
p r e n t i s e t o c o n t r o 1 a ] ] a s p e c t s o f 11 i e :i i p a r t n e i: s h i p' s d i s s c ] i 11 :i o i i 
after his death. Id. Not one word of contrary testimony was 
presented by the heirs. No testimony indicated a single dispute 
between Fred and Joe 1 ques t i o n i i i g t h e v a ] u a t :i :> i I , 1 i a i i d 1 i i i g, o i 
administration of their respective partnership contributions. 
This uncontroverted testimony also refutes the heirs' on] y 
argument on the merits. The heirs contend that J oel's labor was 
not a capital contribution because of Joel's "failing to keep 
r e c o r d s D f t :i i i i e w o r k e d o i d e m a n d i n g w a g e s . '' S e e H e :i r s ' R e p ] y a t 
24. This fact actually weighs in favor of an agreement that 
Joel's labor was a capital contribution, not against it. The 
t o f: a ] ii t y « ::»f t: 1 I e t e s t :i i i: i : • i i} ! :i i I d :i c a t e s 11: i a t J o e J 1 a b o r e d a s a 
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contribution to the partnership, not for wages. The partnership 
was created to benefit Joel. (R. 282, p.6-7 & 147-48). It was 
not intended for Joel to work for free to benefit Fred's heirs. 
Furthermore, Utah courts have recognized that agreements 
altering general rules about the status of labor within a 
partnership may be "either express or implied." See Knutson v. 
Lauer, 627 P.2d 66, 69 (Utah 1981). Thus, it is proper for this 
Court to determine that Fred's and Joel's partnership agreement 
included an unspoken agreement that Joel's labor had to be a 
capital contribution if Fred's money was deemed so.3 
Thus, the trial court should have recognized that the 
partners' individualized agreement modified otherwise controlling 
partnership distribution statutes. Given the uncontroverted 
testimony, the trial court erred in concluding that Joel's labor 
was not a capital contribution. 
C. Precedent supports this Courtis recognizing an 
agreement contrary to statutory distribution rules and 
applying that agreement to credit Joel appropriately 
for his labor. 
Joel portrayed the partnership agreement as equating his 
labor with Fred's money for all partnership purposes. This 
agreement fits within the scope of previously recognized 
exceptions to dissolution statutes, which are otherwise 
3
 The heirs correctly point out that the trial court made 
no findings regarding the value of Joel's services. Heirs' 
Reply at 24. Its ultimate decision required no such findings. 
Although the heirs' counsel questioned Joel's estimates of the 
value of his labor, the heirs presented no evidence that 
contradicted Joel's valuation of his services. 
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int-vprpted ' denyinc; ' abor status as a capital contribution. 
The heirs' attempted distinctions from the precedent cited in 
Joel's Brief are not relevant to this determination. See Heirs' 
Rep] y at. 24, i ] 1 0 (d 1 scussi rig J oe] ' s Bi i ef at 48-49) . 
For example, in Eardley v. Sammons, the appellate court 
concluded that in a partnership where one partner provided labor 
and the othez advanced money , tl le wages conten iplated for the 
laboring partner were non-cash capital contributions. 330 P.2d 
at: 1 26 . Contrary to the heirs' contention, the distinction 
between a laboring partners' unpaid wages and J oel' s coi iti: ibi it::i oi i 
of uncompensated labor is without relevance. See Heirs' Reply at 
24 , , Th.e Eardley r court i: ecognized t:hat: 11 Ie pa.rtnership 
understanding required, one partner to risk, money while the other 
risked, his labor. 330 P. 2d at ] 26 Under such circumstances, it 
wa s app rop i i at e t o e qi ia t e 1.1 ie s e :: ont r :i but :i oi i s a. s c a.p :i t a. 1 
contributions for purposes of partnership dissolution. See id. 
Certainly this Utah decision opens the door for consideration of 
uncompensated labor as a capital contribi I11oi I ui ider appropriate, 
narrowly defined circumstances. 
In a.dd:i t:I o n t: 1 ie 1 Ie:i rs ' contentions regarding Farris v . 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue are without merit. According to 
the heirs, "the [Farris] parties had prepared a. written 
part:ners 1 Ii p agreement tha.t c 1 ear] y set fc rt: 1 i the va] i i.e of the 
partner's [sic] personal services and contemplated the tr eatment 
of labor as a capital contribute on." Heirs' Reply at 29, i i 
H o w e v e i , :i i I p e i: t: I i i e n t p a i t t: 1 i e p a i t: n e r s 1 i i p a g r e e m e i I t :i i i 
250\22885 1 
Farris actually stated that (1) the silent partner desired to 
furnish money while two others desired to furnish "a substantial 
part of their time, knowledge and experience;" (2) all parties 
agreed that the contributions of each party were essential to the 
partnership is success; (3) the two laboring partners would 
"devote such of their time and attention as was necessary to the 
objects of the partnership;" and (4) at termination, partnership 
profits would be shared one-half for the partner furnishing 
money, and one-half for the two partners providing labor. 
Farris, 222 F.2d at 321. The agreement made no mention of labor 
as a capital contribution. Id. 
The Farris court then looked to the partnership 
understanding, its bookkeeping, and "the construction placed upon 
their agreement by the parties themselves" to determine that both 
the contribution of money and the contribution of services, skill 
and knowledge were capital contributions. Id. at 322. That 
court declared that, in partnerships where one partner 
contributed all the money and the other contributed all the 
labor, the labor could be considered a non-cash capital 
contribution. Id. 
In the absence of a contrary provision in the agreement 
where one partner contributes money or physical assets 
and the other contributes personal services, skill and 
knowledge, they share in the capital assets according 
to the value placed on each contribution. 
Id. 
In both cited cases, the courts' decisions turned upon the 
reality of one partner's contributing all the money and the other 
250\22885 1
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contra buting a] ] the labor. It was not the details of the 
partnership, but rather the acknowledgement 01 this lealisy Lhal 
converted the laboring partners' contribution into a non-cash 
c a p i t: a 3 c o n t :i : :i ] D I 1 1 :i o i 1 f c • i p i 11 : p o s e s o f d : s t: :t : :i b i 11 i o n upon
 ; 
dissolution. 
Joel's previous brief also noted that other state courts 
have recogi 1 ized cir cui i istances w 1 iere persona.1 services of a 
laboring partner "may constitute a capital contribution to the 
partnership)." ilnnl's Brief at 4 9 (quoting Schymanski v. 
Conventz , 674 P. 2d 2hi, 284 (Alaska ls8J l (emphasis :i i I 
original)), The appropriateness of recognizing non-cash capital 
conti: i bution.. was fuM }\f*r explained bv a Wisconsin court in 
affirming a determination that a laboring partner's efforts were 
his capital contribution. See Thompson, 111 N.W.2d at 174-75. 
Accordi ng tc the Wisconsin csu n , ; isat ut as d.i at ati rig that labor 
be compensated only by a share of partnership profits do not 
apply "where the skill and labor of the partner are his 
contribution to the capital assels ul tin- paiLnership, as in Lhn 
instant case." Id, at 175. In that case, pursuant to can oral 
agreement, one partner financed a lake resort construction 
project while the o t h e r contributed h i s cabinet- rn a k i n g s k :i 1 ] s a i i d 
labor. Id. at 172. After analyzing the laboring partner's 
efforts the coi ir t dec] ared "'"The re11 irn of such contribution on 
liquidation is not remuneration, but a return of capital 
investment." Id. at 175. Simi larly, Joel contributed his labor 
a s a c a p i t a ] c o i 11 r i b u t i o n t: o I: i :i s p a i t: n e r s h i p w :i t: 1 i F" r e d I I e d :i • :i 
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all that was necessary to make the partnership succeed: In 
Joel's words, while Fred contributed the money, he himself 
contributed "my youth, my work I am able to do, the stuff, that 
was the value of me." R. 282 p. 73-74. Certainly this otherwise 
uncompensated contribution fits within the scope of non-cash 
contributions recognized by other courts as capital contributions 
to a partnership. 
D. This court has the opportunity to acknowledge and 
enforce an agreement contrary to partnership 
distribution statutes. 
Given the facts and circumstances of this case, a 
determination that there existed an agreement contrary to the 
statutory dissolution scheme would permit this Court to 
accomplish an equitable result without doing violence to the 
general statutory principle. The testimony indicating the 
existence of a partnership agreement equally respecting Joel's 
labor and Fred's money is uncontroverted. The trial court used 
the "gift" handle to endure that this agreement would survive 
Fred and control dissolution of the partnership. 
This Court has the opportunity to acknowledge that in this 
case, Joel's labor was his non-cash capital contribution. This 
determination could permit this Court to affirm the trial court 
and provide closure to this litigation. 
2b0\2288s 1 10 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO MERIT TO THE HEIRS7 CONTENTION THAT JOEL'S 
CONTINGENT ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE CORNER PARCEL REQUIRED A 
CROSS-APPEAL. 
In the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
trial court specifically found that (1) Fred and Joel entered 
into a partnership; (2) "the partnership purchased approximately 
1000 acres of land in Weber County" ("the property")/ and (3) 
with $1,500 of Joel's own money, Joel purchased a parcel of land 
(the "corner parcel") adjoining the property that he "intended to 
be part of the partnership and part of his contribution to it." 
(R. 254 8c 257 %^ 24, 25, 44 & 45). The trial court then 
concluded that "Joel and Fred maintained a partnership, herein 
called the 'cattle business', that included in its scope the 
ownership of the [property], the [corner parcel] and the cattle." 
(R. at 257-58). Joel does not dispute this result or the outcome 
concerning these three issues. 
Joel has, however, argued in his Appellee Brief that if this 
Court upholds the trial court's finding concerning partnership 
but reverses the trial court's finding that the property is a 
partnership asset, then this Court should also exclude the corner 
parcel from the partnership. Joel's Brief at 32-33. This 
argument is properly before this Court without a Cross-Appeal. 
The heirs have argued that this Court should reject Joel's 
contingent request for reversal of the decision regarding the 
corner parcel because it would require a cross appeal. (Heirs' 
Brief at 3-5). A cross appeal is only required, however, if Joel 
250X22885 1 „ „ 
seeks to enlarge his rights. See State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 
355-56 (Utah 1996). But, Joel is not attempting to enlarge his 
rights from those granted by the trial court.4 
Instead, Joel requests that if, on appeal, this Court 
substantially diminishes his rights, that diminution should be 
adjusted to reflect the evidence submitted at trial. He should 
not be required to prospectively cross appeal the prospect: of an 
appellate court's adverse decision that cannot be supported on 
the record. 
The trial court's decision adopted Joel's testimony that if 
there were a land and cattle partnership including the property, 
then it was his intent that the partnership include the corner 
parcel that he had purchased after Fred's death. (R. 282, pp. 
65-55) .5 The heirs contend that the property should be excluded 
from the partnership, which nevertheless includes the corner 
4
 Joel would be seeking an enlargement of his rights if he 
sought affirmation of determinations that a partnership existed, 
including the property, but reversal declaring the corner parcel 
his individual property. If he had sought this result, a cross 
appeal would have been necessary. 
5
 In arguing that this issue was not preserved at trial, 
the heir's Reply misstates the relevant testimony. The Reply 
states, "at trial, Joel testified that if a partnership did not 
exist, then he was entitled to the Corner Property." Heirs' 
Reply at 4 (discussing R. 282, p.65) (emphasis in original). 
The record, however, clearly indicates that the trial court 
narrowed the discussion from "any" partnership to the specific 
land and cattle partnership at issue. (R. 282, p. 65). Joel 
then clarified that it was a partnership including the property 
to which he intended to contribute the corner parcel. Id. at 
65-66. For example, Joel stated, "I bought it so I had better 
access to the ground. If this was a partnership, I was 
considering that was part of the ground." Id. at 65. 
^0 2288J 12 
parcel. It is this contention that cannot be supported on the 
record. There was no testimony to that effect. In fact, the 
heirs' Complaint does not even assert a right to the corner 
parcel. 
Thus, the record only supports the trial court's three-part 
determination that Joel and Fred formed a partnership that 
included the property and the Corner Parcel. Based upon the 
testimony submitted to the trial court, it would be clear error 
to remove the property from the partnership while retaining the 
corner parcel as a partnership asset. Joel therefore asks this 
Court to affirm the decision of the trial court as to this matter 
in its entirety. 
CONCLUSION 
Joel asks this Court to affirm the trial court's decision in 
its entirety, including disposition of issues regarding 
partnership, partnership property, and gift. Affirming would 
provide the closure to this litigation that Joel seeks. 
If, however, this Court reverses the gift determination, 
Joel asks it to address his cross appeal and reverse the trial 
court's legal conclusion that Joel's labor was not a capital 
contribution because the unique facts of this case create an 
agreement contrary to the dissolution statutes as interpreted by 
case law. 
Furthermore if this Court should reverse the trial court's 
decision and find that the property is not a partnership asset, 
it should declare that Joel personally owns the corner parcel. 
250\22885 1 „ _ 
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